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a long time, and I keep on burping up the taste of those
~amned Vienna Sausages. Ithasn'tbeenaslongforyou;
m fact, you've made out on this bargain. Ifonly I got paid
by the word. Concise, they wanted concise, and this my
future,my academic tomorrow. Short said Simons short
talk about money. But instead, money talks. (And when
money talks, General Motors listens.)
I
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Hope and Disappointment: Democracy in Poland after Four Years
By Leszek Koczanowicz
Wroclaw University
Wroclaw Poland
I

-And the Masons know it all, in league with the powers-that-be, in leagues of nations, IMF-get it? - I'M a
Freemason. But this is not conspiracy, this is erecting,
building, cementing, revelation. Mortaring walls that
shelter us from the things outside ourselves. And that
wind, whispering through theventsandcracks,isbarely
noticed, moved through dull riveted ductwork hung
from the ceiling. Instead, a span of greenbacks, as far as
the eye can see. It's people like the masons and the IMF
that have brought tomorrow into sight, through a greenlined and notarized tunnel with a golden glow, and
perhaps a doctor's slapping hand, a high-five note on
your backside, at the end. It's people like them, and
countless others, who brought about this shiny, golden
time, and thank God it's here. Green means go. So polish
up your credit cards, keep your accounts well oiled, and
your checkbooks balanced. Hop on your bikes and cars.
We've got cash to flow, and the future to see, I can see it,
there it is.
-Postpartum
*A new cycle of the ages.

The chain of revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe posed again the
question of the nature and domain of democracy. People who struggled against
the totalitarian state in the name of democracy had to answer the question of
what democracy is. In the course of the fight the answer was relatively simple:
the reverse image of the existing situation. But after the success the leaders of
the underground movement had to cope with the problem of setting up the
structure of state and social institutions, while at the same time being under the
pressure of hardships of the economic situation inherited after the communist
state. The task was even worse because the majority of these countries did not
have a strong democratic tradition and even if they did, this tradition had been
forgotten. For that reason, the general agreement as to the neces&ty of creating
a democratic state goes along with stormy discussions connected with the real
shape of such a state. The countries with a long tradition of democracy have
worked out their models for the years of trials and failures and the differences
between them reflect this complicated history. People in Eastern and Central
Europe do not have enough time to consider various models, as they have to
solve their problems now. On the other hand, the success in this enterprise
could prove the relevance of democracy not only for highly educated and rich
societies but also for societies having much worse conditions. The success is not
guaranteed: on the contrary, the voices are rising up in the region that a
moderate authoritarian regime could be a better system in these circumstances.
Every generalization is, of course, risky as the region is highly differentiated in
political as well as social dimensions.

l

Focusing my considerations on the case of Poland, I would like to separate
two topics, namely the categories marking the theoretical field of discussion on
democracy and some examples of political activity in Poland. These two topics
are, of course, interwoven but not identical, as the first is mainly connected with
the intellectual's reflection on political life, whereas the second is concerned
with political praxis. The gap between them is an interesting sign of changes in
political thought. Under communist government, democracy was a purely
intellectual matter having nothing in common with real life. The collapse of the
communist regime had to bring these problems from the domain of thought to
the confrontation with real social needs. Presenting two ends of the process of
democratization in Poland should, I hope, show the tension between the
conceptual framework and the play of political powers.
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(1) Past and present, or the burden of history.
To foreign observers, Polish society seems to be obsessed with history.
Some people are prone to condemn much of our histo:ry. Some express p ride in
it. There are various reasons for this interest in the topic. For many years the
discussion about these questions replaced a real debate on contemporary
issues. Therefore, a future historian can wonder why people spent so much time
and energy discussing abstract historical problems. This replacement was
po~ible as the Polish political life was frozen in post-war circumstances, frozen
in the sense that real political differentiation had almost nothing in common
with the form.al political participation in communist organizations, at least until
the rise of the political underground movement in the middle seventies. It was
po~ible to meet in the communist party people from Leftist to extremely
nationalistic orientation. Not being able to present their political views openly,
they tried · to smuggle their personal points of views as merely different
opinions on historical topics.
Of course, the other dimension of this problem was connected with the
communist party's attempts to "coloniz.e" the past. Traditionally, we had two
main trends in Polish history, one which recognized the main enemy on the East
and the second which considered Germany as a main threat for the nation. The
Communist Party referred to the second but it was developed by the nationalistic and bourgeois movement in pre-war Poland. So as the communist slogans
were losing their power, the Party was using nationalistic rhetoric more and
more extensively but it could not come to its logical conclusion because then the
power of the Soviet Union would be at stake.
This discussion about historical issues became even more vivid after the
transformation. The first reaction was thus to return to the pre-war political
reality by referring back to the argumentation and the ideas supporting it. I
think that the most important event from this point of view was the discussion
about the so-called "coming back" to Europe. The proponents of this slogan
tried to persuade us that the history of Poland was closely connected with the
history of Europe, except for the brief break during the communist p eriod.
Coming back to Europe was to mean the adoption, or strictly speaking the readoption, of-the values and the social and political institutions of Westem
civiliz.ation. The opponents of such an idea of Polish history put emphasis on
the particularity of the history of the count:ry showing that the exceptional
character of Polish fate enabled us to preserve and develop the values forgotten
or neglected in the West. This discussion to some extent reflected Romantic
attitudes in Polish thought.

In this period Poland, then under the power of Russia, Austria and Prussia,
was perceived by some thinkers as the "Messiah of Nations" in the sense that
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the necessary condition of her regaining of independence was to break down
these conservative states, which would to mean the achievement of freedom for
the whole of Europe. This attitude was reinforced by the events of the recent
decade. Poland was seen as a hero of any anti-totalitarian movement in the
socialistic camp and as the first prey of repression under Martial Law in 1981.
When the chances for the dismantling of the totalitarian state appeared again
in 1989, many people expected a prize for their persistent resistance against the
communist state. Poland should be rewarded by the massive international aid
from Western countries. When, for many reasons, this did not occur, resentment against the West rose again. The histo:ry of Poland was depicted as a chain
of sacrifices on the Polish side and betrayals on the W estem countries' side. The
argument referred to the Polish uprising in the nineteenth centu:ry, the Yalta
agreement, and even deeper in the past. The moral result of this reasoning was
a serious doubt about whether Poland should follow W estem culture and
politics in eve:ry respect.
(2) Democracy or common ill.

At the beginning of the transition period in 1989 there was a sto~y
discussion in Poland dealing with ·t he shape of the model of the democratic
state. The roots of this discussion had to be sought in an understanding of the
unique experience of the Solidarity movement. "Solidarity," as constituted in
1980, presented a patchwork of different political orientations ~ed by an
agreement as to the ethical values expressed in the name of the uruon. ~or ~at
reason, "Solidarity" abandoned the traditional branch scheme of orgaruz.atton
of the trade· union movement as leading to the partition of the union and
adopted instead the model in which only regional, not profes.si~al, branches
were permitted. This model of organization as well as the name itself, was to
emphasize a deep unity grounded in ethical val~es. Of ~ourse, such a c~c~t
of social unity was in obvious disagreement with the liberal model of civil
society'' as an institutionalized manner of ~g compromise~~ s.trust?e ~~
contradictory interests. Even if, as under Martial Law, the term ct~ ~ety
was extensively used by underground Solidarity, it meant the orgaruzatton of
society against the totalitarian state and all the more the unity of the movement
was recognized. When the compromise reached at the "Round Table" enabled
the limited free election, there was much pressure to ~tain the unity of the
Solidarity movement. The justification of this claim was not only the n~d !°r
focusing all strength in the confrontation with the still dangen:>us totalitanan
regime but also the common background of shared values. This strategy w~
proposed by some intellectuals as the best way .to develop .de~ocracy m
Poland. They were afraid that the unique experi~ce of ~lidartty . would
degenerate in the struggle for power between vanous political parties and
interest groups. This concept, of course, got entangled in poli~cal games as the
"ideology" of groups involved in the Round Table compronuse..lt also had a
tactical role as the idea that any struggle between non-commurust groups of

disClosure: Fin de Siecle Democracy

132

Leszek Koczanowicz

interests should be suspended until basic changes in transformation were
completed. I think, however, that behind the political meaning of this idea there
was a fear that something important could be lost if normal political rules were
accepted.

(3) ChristiaD values and the state or Catholicism and democracy.

The role of the Catholic Church in Poland is unquestionable. Historically,
it was a major factor in resistance to foreign powers, and under the communist
regimes it protected efforts aiming at changes in the political system. -The
Solidarity movement was to great extent inspired and led by the Church
although some leaders came from the so-called secular Left, i.e., the group
accepting some ideas of the Left but opposing the communist program. The
alliance between the Church and this group was possible due to the Church's
emphasis on the human rightsand the evolution of the social ideas of Catholicism
toward accepting some forms of the welfare state. This tendency was reinforced
under Martial Law when people believed that the Church was the only
institution able to compete with the communist state. The issue was not only the
material power of the Church that enabled it to support the underground
movement but also it seemed to be the real source of values that survived after
the bankruptcy of communist ideology. Therefore, the coalition between the
Church and the Solidarity movement was possible as far as the latter was an
expression of values opposing communist dogma.
And again the moment of reflection appeared in 1989 when the proces.s of
creating new state institutions began. Then, it turned. out that the values
endorsed by the Church did not need to be shared by the whole society. The
most general problem was connected with the discus.sion of the ideological
impartiality of the state. This idea, usually coupled with liberal democracy from
the French and American Revolutions, was hardly accepted by the Church and
intellectuals associated with it. Criticizing the concept of the impartial character
of 1:}\e state they put forth different kinds of argumentation. The most popul~
was to point out that more than 90% of Polish society identified itself as Cath~lic
so that if we defined democracy according to the will of the majority, the Polish
state should somehow reflect Christian values. The other argument consisted
of claiming that the state had to accept any set of values organizing the life of
society, for instance, schooling or public health. Christian values, as the most
universal and the most grounded in the Western civilization, should play such
a role. There is a great split in the Church itself as to the extent and function of
these values in society. Voices demanding that all state institutions be based on
Christian values are rather rare and so far marginal. But, on the other hand,
there is an agreement between people connected with the Church that the
enlightenment model of the democratic state should not be set up in Poland.
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(4) Revolution but ... against whom?
The Round Table Agreement that was the end of communist rule in Poland
turned out to be a trap for a great part of the Polish opposition. Discussing the
form and method of sharing power with communist authorities meant in fact
to legitimize them. Therefore when massive support for changes in Poland and
in the Soviet Union enabled people to get free of any kind of communist
ideology, the new leaders had to solve the moral dilemma of whether or not
they should hold to the agreement in this situation. This dilemma was also a
political problem consisting of two issues: (1) how to carry out changes without
massive resistance on the side of people supporting the old regime, and (2) h ow
to define a revolution that was organized in accord with its enemies. It is
probably true that the Round Table Agreement enabled us to avoid bloodsh ed
in Poland and in other countries where it serves as a model of solving conflicts.
But, on the other hand, it made it much more difficult to discuss the communist
past because such a discussion became automatically involved in the assessment
of political programs carried out by people who w orked out this deal. In 1980
Solidarity claimed that its revolution was "self-limited" as it did not aim at a
total change in the political system. Paradoxically, what was thought to be a
tactical strategy later became a very serious problem for Polish democracy.
II

(1) Walesa and the presidential wars.
The astonishing career of Lech Walesa made him for Poland and the world
a symbol of the struggle against a totalitarian regime. But his case is a bit more
complicated: he always tried to act as a medium of the common people's
frustration. Hence, his political evolution, which sometimes seems to be
unbelievable for Polish and foreign obseivers, is a logical consequence of his
evaluation of the political moods. In 1989 he led Solidarity to the Round Table
and in fact he became the first prey of this agreement. His colleagues took
positions in the cabinet, his enemy Gen. Jaruzelski became the president, and
for him only the position of Solidarity leader was left. And then Solidarity
became lessandlessimportantaspoliticsmovedfromthe trade union movement
to the parliament and elections. So in 1990 he decided to act against his former
colleagues, and he raised two topics in this struggle: (1) a critique of the speed
of changes in Poland as going on too slowly, and (2) a critique of economic and
social policy in Poland as being over-influenced by the International Mone~
Found and the European Community. In this way he played on the two topics
I mentioned above, the relation to communism and feelings aroused by
disappointment after the success of the Solidarity movement. Also, he presented himself as a person who could renew the Solidarity ethos in the form of
authoritarianism. The image of the "president with an axe,"- i.e., the president
who could punish if necessary and also make things better-could appeal to
people lost in the new reality of various parties and the growth of the free-
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market economy.
In 1990 Walesa won the election, defeating in a second ballot the very
strange person Stan Tyminski, a Canadian businessman and citizen of Poland,
Canada, and Peru. Stan Tyminski's success showed that the values of Solidarity, or that part of them that still had ideological meaning, had lost much in a
populist program in which Poles were to be better off almost instantaneously.
It was the first serious warning that people could look for easier ways of
transformation and that they could decide to get rid of the leaders of the former
underground movement. Walesa understood this situation and the history of
his presidency can be described as the attempt to solve the unsolvable problem
of being a president and a leader of the opposition at the same time. He himself
formulated this dilemma in one of his bon-mots, "I am pro and even more
contra." In political terms Walesa is getting more and more alienated from any
serious political power in Poland and his position is based on the notorious
weakness of subsequent governments and governing coalitions.
(2) The fimt free election, or parties without programs.
In 1991 the first. free election was held in post-war Poland. They were
dominated by the issues which previously appeared in the presidential election,
in fact by rather vague ideas dealing with the speed of transformation, theneed
for condemning the communist past, and to some extent Catholic values and
their role in the state. The main problem of the Polish political state is that there
is no correlation between the political parties and the interests of social classes
or groups. It is not possible here to count all the factors ·influencing this
situation; the important determinants of it are simply so complicated by
circumstances of economic and social life that it is almost impossible to identify
the real political interests of different social groups, and all the more for people
to be aware of them. The only exception is thepeasanny, which has more clearly
described aims and thus is able to support proper parties. No wonder that in
such a situation and in an extremely proportional election system the results
were very ambiguous.

The first position was gained by the Democratic Union, a rather loose
coalition of different political groups united by the remaining of Solidarity
ethics and the personal ties some of its leaders. The next place was obtained by
former communists, then using the name of Social Democrat. Also, this party
is inconsistent in its program as it is unified rather by fears of anti-communist
revenge than by real political interests of party supporters. But in fact, the Social
Democrats, if anybody, could be called winners, together with the nationalisticpopulist Confederation of Independent Poland and the Polish Peasant Party.
Astothelastparty,itisinterestingthatamongseveralpeasantparties,theparty
that was a continuation of the peasant party under the communist regime had
the best results. The main problem with forming the coalition government was
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not connected with the lack of a decisive majority in the parliament, but with the
situation in which the coalitions formed rather on the basis of current political
putposes, than on more general interest. The only taboo which still exists is to
include the former communist party in any kind of coalition. But, it is very
difficult to maintain this principle, especially as after the split in the Democratic
Union, the Social Democrats became the biggest party in the parliament. So
there are frequently repeated attempts to gain the support of the social democrats but without paying the price for it. This strategy, however, was not very
successful, for being in opposition can bring much more profits than sharing
responsibility for the current situation. So far Poland is ruled by a coalition tied
together by the fear of new elections, the results of which would probably be
devastating for the parties who created the coalition. The main principle of the
coalition is not to touch "ideological" questions. In fact the phrase "ideological
question" is a euphemism for the political claims made by the Catholic party
participating in the c~tion.
(3) The issue of abortion or, again, Catholic values and the state.
The party which gained moderate but surprising success was the Christian-National Union. This success was possible due to massive support by the
Catholic Church which in tum probably expected the representation of its
political views in the parliament. The problem the Catholic Church recognized
as the most important was to reverse the law on abortion. Achieving this goal
was to endorse two points in Church politics: (1) giving the example for Europe
and the rest of the world, and (2) supporting the doctrine that the state cannot
be impartial on the ethical issues. Before this election the Church already had
won the battle for introducing religious classes into the schools. Changing the
law on abortion could mean the next step in identifying Catholic values with the
goals of state institutions.

Resistance to this project derived from different motivations. Some people
opposed the idea of introducing Christian values as laws, pointed out that the
Oturch can influence their members by using moral persuasion. Others argued
that the proposed new law would lead to many paradoxes and in fact it would
not be possible to enforce such a law, which in turn could damag~ the
willingness to obey the law, which was already very low. Therefore, the line ~f
division on this issue turned out to be very complicated and even some Catholic
intellectuals were involved in opposing a change in the law. The opponen~ of
the prohibition of abortion organiz.ed committees to gather support for solving
the question by a referendum. These committees consisted of peo~le who
sometimes had very different views on other issues and belonged to different,
often opposing political parties. They were successful in collecting the support
fur a referendum as they were able to gather about a million petition sign~nn:es,
but were not successful in executing a referendum because the constitution
allowed parliament to avoid it. So the new law on abortion was voted on in
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parliament in a slightly less severe form than was originally demanded. This
case shows the weakness of Polish democracy, for the major political parties as
well . as public opinion according to all polls opposed the prohibition of
abortion. Only the opportunistic attitude of politicians who were afraid of the
power of the Church, as well as the unrecoverable split in the coalition enabled
parliamenttointroducethenewlaw.Theycalculatedalsothatchangingthelaw
was a price which had to be paid for the Catholic church's support for the
economic changes in Poland. But the most important result of this discussion
was that a kind of ''Rainbow Coalition" was constituted, a loose confederation
of different groups united by a common goal. Even though it was defeated in
this case, it became a new kind of experience; it was the first time since the fall
of communism that people of different views struggled together.
(4) Revolution -· a.g ainst whom, or everybody was a government agenl
The ghost which haunts Polish politics is called "de-communization" or
lustracja, which is a kind of security clearance. The idea is to some extent
ra~onal. Decommunization is considered to be a barrier to people connected
Wl~ the former regime from taking influential positions in the new social
reality. L~tracj~ is to eliminate from public life those people who were the
agents or intelligence operations. But in practice both ideas seem to create
unsolv~ble p.roblems. Decommunization provokes unending and sophisticated discussions as to the rank of former regime people who should be moved
away from positions in the new administration. The other problem is with
elected positions. What if people choose former officials of the communism
regime? The worst problems arise if you would like to judge who was an agent
and who ~as not. The archives are destroyed or incomplete, the proofs of
collaboration very ambiguous, and it is hard to describe what was real
collaboration or only an attempt to cheat the police. Opinions on this topic are
very ambiguous among political leaders. They are prone at least to some extent
to sup~rt such attempts as they should demolish ultimately the communist
power m ~oland. But, on the other han~, the only serious attempt to do that
resulted m the collapse of the government This happened because the
~~emment l~d by prime minister Olszewski, used the police archives without
entical analysis and then it turned out that a number of people who were leaders
of the underground movement were registered by the police as their agents.
The government r~ealed the names and almost immediately was overtumed
by an. an~ parhament, but the problem still exists. The paradox of this
situation is that former communists are free from such an accusation for the
security ~olice was not allowed to recruit party people as agents. The other
paradox is ~t the main authority in judging who was an agent is in the hands
of ~ormer police.office~~ th.ey ~ve the best .knowledge on the topic. Today,
a big Pa:t of Polish political life is concentrated on the question of whether or
not President Walesa was a plant using nickname "Bolek." ff it turned out to be
true it would, of course, greatly damage not only Walesa's image but the whole
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Solidarity movement. Although, this accusation is supported by some of his
former colleagues from the underground, the moral certificate is given to him
by former Minister of Internal Affairs Gen. Kiszczak and former president Gen.
Jaruzelski. They claim that if Walesa had collaborated with the security police,
they would have taken advantage of such a situation.
III
Conclusions, or between optimism and pessimism.
The image which appears from the previous considerations seems to be
rather pessimistic and it would be possible to show even more drastic examples
of hopelessness in setting up the system of democratic institutions. It is visible
in any segment of political life from local democracy to the capacity for using
democratic procedure in parliament. On the other hand, common people seem
not to see any clear advantages to democracy. In the last election, the first free
elections since World War Il, only 60% of voters participated and according to
sociological polls the number of voters is going to be even less in the next
election. The gap between the political class and the common people is getting
wider and wider, the parliament is perceived as a very inefficient institution far
beneath such institutions as the Army or the Church. People demand a "strong
hand," a soft version of the authoritarian regime. All these facts could suggest
that democracy is in peril, that it will not survive the problems which one can
predict in the near future.
But I would not like to end my paper with such pessimistic conclusions.
The main source of optimism is that democracy works in Poland in spite of the
limitations and the failures I have mentioned above. There is no real political
power which would declare hostility to democracy and would be indeed
interested in making an antidemocratic coup. This is unimaginable. Therefore,
if we are to evaluate the development of democracy in Poland, we have to
precisely describe the points of reference. It ·is true that the procedures of
democracy in Poland as well as in other countries of Eastern Europe often do not
keep up with the standards valid for W estem democracies. On the other hand,
however, if we treat democracy as a process and not as a fixed state, then w e can
discuss the distance from the starting point and· evaluate the trends and
counter-trends in this process. Adopting such a strategy, we notice that the
startingpointof democratic change was the situation in which almost the whole
official social life was under the control of the state and this circumstance was
treated as normal for at least two generations. On the other hand, the resistance
to the state created the illusion of principle unity among different social groups
and a tendency to neglect the possibility of conflicts between them. The trends
which make us more optimistic concerning the development of democracy
assume two reinforcing processes: people should understand that their votes
can change something in their own lives, and, on the other hand, the leaders
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Ahab's Book Shop
have to learn to take into account the real interests of their supporters. It may
sound trivial but I am afraid that it will take some time until one starts to do
politics in this way. Also, I think that the development of democracy will not
be an automatic process: on the contrary, I predict failures, blind alleys and
perils in its course. But I believe that the already created framework of
democratic institutions should survive and become the basis for further development.

I

By Joseph Zomado
University of Connecticut
Late one aftenoon
as the sun died in the west
a bookshop proprietor
heard the books on his shelves
die. His yellowed
fingertips stopped moving from one
worn spine to the next;
he had been feeling for
a story that might explain
his suffering.
Instead, he was struck still
by the whispering spines-a thousand threads
loosening in their bindings-decomposing, decomposing.
'Damn," he mutters,
"I think it's closing."
I said "shelves" a moment ago,
but "shelves" is not exactly right.
He hears the rotting like cockroaches
trotting, even when he lays in bed.
He knows a doctor's findings will
explain it all and atttribute it to some
post-modem, gerentological blight.
Still, the quiet sound of death
provides an inkling
of just how fast his shop is sinking
(as a memento mori should).
I think you ought to know
that aside from selling used books,
drinking bourbon, and killing rats,
this book shop proprietor maintains
four or five bowls of candy that stud his aisles
in sweet defiance of the rotting.
Tootsie rolls and butterscotch
lifesavers spill over every
brim of every bowlhe thinks sweets might help
a child hunt his shopdisClosure: Fin de Siec/e Democracy
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